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THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR A
DESIGN DEFECT STANDARD
STEVEN

G.

DAVISON*

INTRODUCTION

In design defect litigation, the injured plaintiff seeks to establish that
the design and specifications for a product are inadequate because the
manufacturer failed to use some alternative safer design.l Although
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., 1968, Cornell
University; J.D., 1971, Yale University.
1. Three principal categories of product defects can be identified: (1) manufacturing defects,
(2) design defects, and (3) inadequate warnings or instructions concerning the hazards presented by
the product. Se~ W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971). While only
design defects will be discussed in this article, these defects perhaps can best be described in relation
to each other. A manufacturing defect, for example, involves a situation in which the product that
caused an injury was not produced in accordance with the manufacturer's design and specifica·
tions. Se~ Wade, On th~ Nalur~ofSlnct Tort Liability, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 831 (1973). Such defects may
be the result of flawed components or raw materials used in manufacturing the product. Se~, ~.g.,
Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (rex. Civ. App. 1975) (metal in surgical needles weakened
by "crimping" and drilling process, though manufacturer took steps to prevent the flaw).
In a design defect case, the product is manufactured in accordance with the manufacturer's
design and specifications, but the design specifications are inadequate because the manufacturer
did not use a safer alternative design. Se~, ~.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348
N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976) (printing press manufacturer failed to use guards
that would have protected operator from han~ injury). In both design and manufacturing defect
cases, the injured plaintiff attempts to recover damages by establishing that the product was not
made in accordance with a benchmark design or specification. In a manufacturing defect case, the
manufacturer's failure to produce the product in accordance with his own design and specifications
is unintentional and accidental. In a design defect case, on the other hand, the product design is
the result of an intentional decisionmaking process that is "defective," "wrongful," or "inadequate." Se~ Henderson,Judlclol RtvI~w ofManufadurers' Conscious .Design ChOICes: Th~ Limits ofA4/udlcalion, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
The third category of product defects, lack of adequate warnings or instructions, involves a failure to provide, with a product, both warnings of the dangers that consumers may encounter if they
do not use the product for its proper purpose and instructions that inform the user how to avoid
these dangers. Se~ McClanahan v. California Spray Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953)
(orchard spray manufacturer liable for failure to warn of danger to orchards if spray improperly
used).
A sub-category of principal defects is "crashworthiness" or "second collision" defects. These defects do not cause the initial accident, but rather enhance the person's injuries when he collides with
the interior or exterior of the product. Se~, ~.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201,207,321 A.2d 737, 740 (1979). "Crashworthiness" defects can be design defects, as in Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979), or manufacturing defects, as in Lahocki v.
Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (1979), raJ'd on other §7'Owuls sub nom.
General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714,410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
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courts2 and commentators3 have devoted much attention to developing
an appropriate standard to apply in evaluating a product's design, the
courts have not adopted a universal test for analyzing a product's inadequacy or defectiveness. 4 The lack of a clear standard may not provide
manufacturers with sufficient guidance in developing a product's design
and, consequently, may deny consumers a safer and less costly product.
The present design defect standards do not require the judge or the
jury, before holding a manufacturer liable, to find that an alternative,
technologically feasible design is possible that would have prevented
plaintiff's injuries. The standards, moreover, do not require the trier of
fact to find that adoption of an alternative design would have been a
better allocation of the manufacturer's and society's resources. As a result, there are no objective criteria for judges to apply in deciding
whether to submit a design defect case to the jury. Furthermore, if the
case is submitted to the jury, the jury may impose liability on a manufacturer on the basis of whim or caprice.
This article will examine critically the six major tests for deciding
whether a product's design is inadequate or defective by discussing each
test and its inherent weaknesses in actual application. The article then
proposes a new test that should remedy the shortcomings of the other
design defect tests. The proposed standard does not impose liability on
a manufacturer unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a safer, technologically feasible alternative design that results in a more efficient allocation of resources under a marginal cost-benefit analysis, or that the
product's design is so dangerous that it should not be marketed even
though no safer design exists. The article concludes that such a standard would give manufacturers fair notice about the requirements for
the product's design and promote an optimum allocation of resources.
2. For a compilation of products liability cases concerning design defects, see Annot., 96
A.L.R.3d 22 (1979).
3. Se~ gmerally A. WEINSTEIN, A. TwERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DaNAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT (1978); Fischer, Products Liabilz(y-Th~ M~aning of
.Deftct, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Henderson, .D~ign .Deftct Litigation &lJisit~d, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 541 (1976) [hereinafter cited as .Deftct LI~igationj; Henderson, Rm~w~dJudicial ContTOoersy Ooer
.Deftctiue Product .D~ign: Toward th~ Pr~ervation ofan Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rm~w~d ControlJersy j; Henderson, note 1 supra; Hoenig, ProtilKt .D~igns and Strict
Tort Liability: Is There a Beller Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabilzty:
TIr~ M~aning of ".Deftct" in th~ Manufacture and .D~sign of ProdlKts, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969);
Keeton, ProdlKt Liability and th~ M~aning of .Deftct, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton, Prodt«ts
Liabilz(y-.D~lgn Hazards and t!t~ M~aning of.Deftct, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293 (1979); Phillips, Th~ Standord
.for .Determining .DeftctilJm~ss in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101 (1977); Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher & Piehler, Th~ Us~ and Abus~ of Warnings in Products Liabilz(y-.D~lgn .Deftct Litigation Com~s of
Ag~, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976); Wade,supra note 1; Walkowiak, ProdlKt Liability Litigation and
th~ Conc~Pt of .DeftctilJ~ Goods: "&asonablm~s" &lJisl~~d?, 44 J. AIR LAw & COM. 705 (1979).
4. But see Rm~w~d ControlJersy, supra note 3, at 773-76 (emerging consensus that the cost-benefit
analysis is the proper analysis).
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THE PURPOSES THAT A DESIGN DEFECT TEST SHOULD SERVE

A design defect standard has three basic purposes. It is used to alleviate a plaintiff's difficulty in proving fault or lack of reasonable care by a
manufacturer in designing a product,5 to allocate risks and spread losses
from injuries resulting from the use of defective products,6 and to provide an incentive to manufacturers to produce a safe product. 7 In order
to fulfill this third objective, a design defect standard must provide a
manufacturer with precise guidelines concerning minimum product
safety. Guidelines will enable the manufacturer to predict whether he
will be held liable for damages if the product's design causes injury to
persons or property.
If a design defect standard does not enable the manufacturer to make
a reasonable determination regarding the minimum safety requirement
expected for the product, and the manufacturer's design falls below such
minimum requirements and results in injury to persons or property, the
public is harmed in at least two ways. First, consumers may incur injuries that might have been avoided if a safer design had been adopted or,
if no safer design were available or feasible, the product had not been
marketed. Second, if the manufacturer cannot determine minimum
product safety requirements, an inefficient allocation of resources may
result, with the consumer bearing the burden.8
Similarly, if the lack of precision in a design defect standard causes a
manufacturer to err on the side of caution and produce a product that is
much safer than the law requires, society may again suffer. Additional
safety measures, not required by law, can raise the product's price by an
exorbitant amount or significantly decrease the product's utility.9
Moreover, the capital needed to design and produce these additional
safety features may have to be diverted from uses that society might find
more desirable. In recognition of these concerns, courts do not require a
5. &t' Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (fraynor, J.. concurring) (absolute liability advocated as logical extension of concept of implied warranty
of safety).
6. One court has stated this purpose to be "the primary policy rationale convincing courts to
adopt strict products liability." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979).
7. Id.
8. Such misallocation occurs when the costs of the liability for damages to injured consumers-damages that would have been avoided if a safer design had been used-exceed both the
manufacturer's transaction costs of making a safer design and the abatement costs of producing a
safer product. &t', t.g., Posner, Sirici Liability: A Commmi. 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973) (suggests
retaining contributory negligence defense as incentive for party with most efficient solution to take
precautions in order to reduce avoidable costs to society); Sachs, /Wgligt'1lCt' or Sinet Product Liability: Is
77zm- Rtally a IJi.fft'Tt'1lCt ill Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 259 (1978) (focusing on the
economic costs and benefits of strict products liability).
9. &t', t'.g., MicaIlefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 122 (1976) (product can become unworkable when an alleged missing feature is added or can
become so expensive as to be priced out of the market).
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manufacturer to design an "accident-proof' or "injury-proof' product
or to act as an insurer. to
A design defect standard should be as precise as possible because society is ill-served if a manufacturer designs a product that is considerably
more safe or less safe than the law requires. At the same time, the standard should continue to serve the goals of protecting consumers from
injury and compensating those who are injured while using a product.
II.

THE MAJOR DESIGN DEFECT TESTS

The courts generally apply one or more of the following six tests to
determine whether a product is defective in its design:ll (1) the deviation-from-the-norm test;12 (2) the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A test;13 (3) the ordinary consumer expectations test;14 (4) the riskutility test; 15 (5) the California hybrid test; 16 and (6) Professor Henderson's design testY A critical examination of the six major design defect
standards illustrates several weaknesses in each. These inadequacies
lead to numerous problems for courts, juries, and manufacturers in applying these standards, thereby indicating a need for a new, more effec10. Su, ~.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216-17, 321 A.2d 737, 745
(1974). Automobile manufacturers, however, are under a duty to use such care as would "avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event ofa collision." Id. at 217, 321 A.2d
at 746 (quoting Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968».
11. The first five tests are recognized as the major tests used by the courts to determine product defectivene:;s. Se~ Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska 1979). Professor
James Henderson proposed a sixth test in Henderson, supra note 1.
12. Under this test, a product is defective if it does not compare in quality to most similar
products. Thus, the manufacturer is liable for injuries resulting from the product's "deviation from
the norm." Se~ Traynor, Th~ Wty's and M~ans of.D~ctive Products and Strict Lia6ilz9', 32 TENN. L. REV.
363,367 (1965). Se~ also notes 18-27 & accompanying text infta.
13. The seller is liable for injury caused by a product if it is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, to the consumer, or to his property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Se~ notes 28-32 & accompanying text
zi!fia.
14. A product is defective if: (1) it leaves the seller's hands in an unreasonably dangerous
condition not contemplated by the consumer, and (2) it is more dangerous than the ordinary consumer with ordinary knowledge of the product's characteristics would expect. Grenno v. Clark
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965). This test is also generally known as the useroriented or seller-oriented test. Se~ notes 33-56 & accompanying text infta.
15. Under this test, the court weighs diverse factors relating to the product's utility or desirability and its risk or dangerousness. Se~ Keeton, Product Li'a6i1z9' and th~ M~aning ofIHftct, supra note 3,
at 37-38; Wade, supra note 1. at 837-38. Se~ also notes 49-87 & accompanying text infta.
16. The California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), adopted a design defect test that combines the consumer expectation test
with a risk-utility analysis. Se~ notes 88-107 & accompanying text zi!fia.
17. Henderson proposes that courts should not find a manufacturer's inadvertent design error
defective if the design is consistent with professional engineering standards. Moreover, the manufacturer's conscious design choice is not grounds for liability if such design complies with governmental safety standards or, in the absence of such standards, the product is accompanied by
adequate warnings and instructions. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1548-50. Se~ notes 108-29 & accompanying text infta.
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tive design defect test. IS
A.

The Deoiation-j7om-the-Norm Test

Under the deviation-from-the-norm test, a product is found defective
if it is not of the same quality as other similar products. 19 Although this
test has been found reliable in defining manufacturing defects,2° it is
18. An area of disagreement in design defect cases revolves around the issue of whether a test
for determining the adequacy of a design should vary depending on whether the cause of action is
for negligence or strict liability. Su Renewed ControveT{)" supra note 3, at 777. Some courts believe
that the standard for determining the adequacy of a product's design is the negligence standard of
reasonable care. These courts require the application of the negligence standard even though the
cause of action asserted by the plaintiff is strict liability in tort or breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America,
Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48 (1974); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc.,
29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973).
A second approach requires that different design defect standards apply in "strict liability" actions and in negligence actions. See Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397, 564
P.2d 674, 675-76 (1977). This case distinguishes negligence and strict liability actions: In negligence
cases, foreseeability of harm is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, whereas in strict
liability cases, the product's harmful propensities are assumed regardless of whether the manufacturer or seller foresaw or should have foreseen the danger. Id.; see also Ulrich v. Kasceo Abrasives
Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397,
564 P.2d 674, 675-76 (1977); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 486, 494-96, 525 P.2d 1033,
1037-38 (1974). Courts following the first approach reject this second approach on the grounds that
"a manufacturer who designed the product obviously would have knowledge of the defect, since the
design of the product is an intentional act on the manufacturer's part." Frericks v. General Motors
Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305, 336 A.2d 118, 128 (1975). At least one jurisdiction has posited another
distinction between the design defect standard applicable in negligence actions as opposed to strict
liability actions. Schulides v. Service Mach. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1978). In a
negligence action, there may be recovery for personal injuries caused by a product's design when it
was designed without ordinary care even though its design was not established to be unreasonably
dangerous, as is required in most jurisdictions in a strict liability action under § 402A of the Restatement of Torts. See, e.g., Suter v. San Antonio Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.]. 150,406 A.2d 140
(1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). This
doctrine has been criticized, however, on the grounds that a "designer cannot have been negligent
in his design choices unless the resulting design poses an unreasonable risk of harm." Renewed Contrrwtl'{)', supra note 3, at 803.
Another issue considered in design defect litigation revolves around the rule that some courts
apply to deny recovery to a plaintiff who was injured by design defects whose dangers are patent or
obvious. See Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67, reheanizg dmied, 513 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1974), eert.
dented, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Micallefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571. 384 N.Y.S.2d ll5 (1976). The majority of courts,
however, find that a manufacturer can still be liable for injuries caused by a design defect whose
dangers are obvious or patent if there is a feasible, inexpensive, alternate design available that
would reduce or eliminate the risk of injury. .see, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 38485,348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77, 384 N.Y.S.2d lIS, 120-21 (1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3
Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 718-19 (1970). See general{)1 Darling, The Patent .Danger Rule: An
Ana{)1sis and a Sul'V9 oj'its Vila/r'fy, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583 (1978); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong.Does
Not Mole a Right: Manufacturers' Liabilt'fy for Patent{)1 Dongerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065
(1973).
19. For example, a soda bottle is defective if it is chipped around its mouth.
20. Set', t.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969) (automobile found to have defectively connected drive shaft); Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile defectively manufactured
where brakes activated unexpectedly); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (lathe built without proper fastening device found defective
when similar lathes incorporated device).
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unsuitable in design defect cases for several reasons. First, while comparing one manufacturer's line of products with those of other manufacturers may be helpful in determining whether the design is inferior to its
counterparts, courts have not viewed consistency with industrywide
practices as the determinative factor in strict liability or negligence
cases. 21 The deviation-from-the-norm test thus can never be definitive
in ascertaining a design defect. 22
Second, this test may be over-inclusive in defining design defects and
may deprive society of many worthwhile and necessary products. 23 The
polio vaccine, for example, is an unavoidably dangerous product because it contains an inherent risk that the user will react adversely to the
product and contract polio. 24 Under the deviation-from-the-norm test,
these types of unavoidably dangerous products would be found defective, and consequently manufacturers would no longer market them. 25
Finally, this test places the burden of proving the product's deviation
on the plaintiff. 26 In design defect litigation, this is a particularly heavy
burden because the plaintiff must offer technical evidence on how a
manufacturer's engineering standards deviate in quality from the design
standards of other manufacturers. The deviation-from-the-norm test is
therefore unsuitable for application in design defect cases because it
defeats one of the major goals of products liability theory-relieving the
plaintiff of the burden of proof. 27
B.

The Restatement (Second)

of Torts Section

102A Test

Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability
on a seller for any injury caused by a product if the product is, at the
time it left the seller's hands, in a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous to the user, to the consumer, or to his property.28 Courts
have interpreted section 402A in several ways. Although most courts
21. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 (Alaska 1979).
22. ld.
23. Su'Traynor, supra note 12, at 367.
24. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), the court stated that
the manufacturer of Sabin oral polio vaccine could not be held liable solely because plaintiff had
contracted polio after receiving the vaccine. The court stated in dicta that a manufacturer cannot
guarantee to every user that the drug is safe for his individual use. Such a requirement would deter
manufacturers from marketing drugs that are normally the most effective in combatting disease.
ld. at 128.
25. Me gmnally Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 134
(1972).
26, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 (Alaska 1979).
27. ld. For a more extensive discussion of the inadequacies of the deviation-from-the-norm
test, see Traynor, supra note 12, at 367-73.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A. The seller must also be engaged in the business of
selling that product and the product must be expected to, and does, reach the consumer without
substantial change in its condition. If the plaintiff meets the standards of this test, he has no burden
of proving specific acts of negligence by the manufacturer, who is then deemed negligent per se. Mt'
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apply section 402A in conjunction with the American Law Institute's
comments g and i, termed the ordinary consumer expectations test,29 or
with a risk-utility balancing test,30 some courts have adopted it as a design defect standard exclusive of the comments. 31
A design defect standard such as section 402A, exclusive of comments
g and i, that simply states that a product's design is defective if the product's condition is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, provides only minimal, if any, guidance to a trial judge. No guidelines exist
to help the judge decide whether a design defect case should go to the
jury, and, if the case does reach the jury, the jurors are given little or no
guidance in formulating a judgment. The jury thus would decide design defect cases on the basis of whim or caprice if this test were all that
the judge charged in the jury instructions. This standard also is deficient in providing guidelines for manufacturers regarding safety features
that should be incorporated into the product's design.32

C.

The Ordinat), Consumer Expectations Test

A number of courts that have adopted the section 402A test base the
definition of a defective product on comments g33 and i. 34 The use of
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 230 N.W.2d
794, 797 (1975).
29. &,r, ,r.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for strict liability against seller
and manufacturer because product did not contain unreasonably dangerous defective condition as
defined in comments g and i). The texts of comments g and i are set forth in notes 33 & 34 infta.
30. &,r,.rog., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (jury should
apply risk/utility analysis in determining liability that questions whether reasonably prudent manufacturer would place product on the market after balancing hazards against utility).
31. J},r Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55,63 (1967) (sufficiency of complaint against manufacturer judged without reference to supplemental comments though court refused to specifically accept or reject them). Section 402A is followed by 17 comments that are used
by many courts when applying the section to a factual situation.
32. The § 402A test without comments g and i also is unsuitable for use by courts that have
deleted the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement from design defect cases based on strict liability. A workable definition of "defective condition" is still needed. S.r,r Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin the court used comments g and i
to define defectiveness, but rejected the term "unreasonably dangerous" as placing a burden that
rings of negligence on a plaintiff in a strict liability case. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 442.
33. Comment g defines "defective condition" in part as follows: "The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A.
34. Comment i defines "unreasonably dangerous" in part as follows:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food
or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary
sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by 'unreasonably dangerous' in this
Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary customer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.
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section 402A in conjunction with the two comments is generally called
the ordinary consumer expectations test, under which there are two
common approaches: user-oriented and seller-oriented. Under the useroriented approach, a product is defective if: (1) it leaves the seller's
hands in an unreasonably dangerous condition not contemplated by the
consumer, and (2) it is more dangerous than the ordinary consumer with
ordinary knowledge of its characteristics would expect. 35 This test gives
legal effect to consumer expectations that result from the manufacturer
or seller placing the product in the stream of commerce with the intention that it be purchased.36 By marketing the product, the seller represents that it is not unreasonably dangerous if put to its intended use. 37
Under the seller-oriented approach, a product is defective if it is so
unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable seller would not have sold the
product had he known of its harmful character.38
The Oregon
Supreme Court argues that the user-oriented standards are essentially
the same as those of the seller-oriented approach "because a seller acting
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A.
35. Seo!", o!".g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Ginnis v. Mapes
Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d
806 (1967); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230
N.W.2d 794 (1975). This test is also referred to as the user-oriented or seller-oriented test. Note also
that there is some dispute over whether the Restatement's standards of "defective condition" and
"unreasonably dangerous" establish one or two requirements. It has been suggested that § 402A
enunciates two distinct requirements for recovery and that unless a product is both defective and
unreasonably dangerous, liability will not be imposed. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). Dean Wade argues, on the other hand,
that the two terms comprise only one test. Wade, supra note 1, at 829. Seo!" also Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 n.36 (Alaska 1979).
36. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 263, 509 P.2d 529, 532 (1973).
37. Id. The court assumes that a rationale similar to that which underlies an implied warranty of merchantability is part of the theoretical basis for § 402A. The court thus analogizes the
term "defective" under strict liability theory to "unmerchantable" under the theory of implied
warranty for the sale of goods.
38. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) Qack of harmful
character oflawnmower design found not to be unreasonably dangerous for normal use); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (reasonably prudent manufacturer having knowledge of the manner in which sanding machine was used would have provided
safety feature or additional warning).
At one time, the Texas Supreme Court required the jury to be instructed in a design defect case
that a design is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous. Such condition exists "(1) if the product
threatens harm to persons using the [product) to the extent that any [product) so designed would
not be placed in the channels of commerce by a prudent manufacturer aware of the risk involved in
its use or (2) to the extent that the [product) would not meet the reasonable expectations of the
ordinary consumer as to its safety." Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.
1979) (citing Henderson v. Ford Motor Corp., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977». The Tum" case involved an alleged crashworthiness design
defect in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages for paralysis that resulted from his vertebrae
being crushed when his automobile rolled over, collapsing the car's roof. The Texas court in Tum"
noted that the first prong of this instruction on unreasonably dangerous design that draws the jury's
attention to "the additional perspective of the prudent manufacturer is to the advantage and for
the benefit of an injured plaintiff and is available to him if under the facts the defect is apparent, or
if it is felt that the fact finders might be diverted by the lack of expectations of the consumer with
regard to the details of product design." Id. at 850.
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reasonably would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing."39
Some courts have added to the confusion surrounding defect tests by
describing both the user-oriented and seller-oriented standards as the
weighing of the product's utility against the risk of harm of its use,
thereby suggesting that the consumer expectations test is synonymous
with the risk-utility test. 40 In actual application, however, user-oriented
and seller-oriented tests cannot be viewed as identical to the risk-utility
test because juries are not instructed to decide design defect cases based
upon a risk-utility analysis. For example, although the Oregon Supreme
Court requires the trial court to apply the risk-utility test in determining
whether to send a design defect case to the jury, the jury itself is instructed to use the seller-oriented standard in its determination. 41
Under the user-oriented or the seller-oriented standard, a court will
not allow a jury to speculate about the expectations of the ordinary consumer.42 The jurors must base the determination upon the experiences
of an average person, expert testimony, or other evidence that establishes what reasonable consumers expect from a product. 43 The problem with this approach, however, is that jury instructions merely state
that a product is defectively designed if: (1) the plaintiff demonstrates
that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when it was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,44 or
(2) it is so harmful to persons or property that a reasonably prudent
39. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-74, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27
(1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1979). See olso Wade, supro note
I, at 837-40.
41. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974).
42. See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (evidence not sufficient
for jury to make informed decision on what ordinary consumer expects from product).
43. The jury is charged with determining the factual question of what reasonable consumers
expect from the product. Where the jury has no experience for knowing this, however, the record
must supply such a basis. In the absence of either common experience or evidence, any verdict
would, in effect, be the jury's opinion of how safe the product should be. Such an opinion by the
jury would be formed without the benefit of data concerning the cost or feasibility of designing and
building safer products. Without reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifications for deciding what is reasonable. Id. at 474, 435 P.2d at B09. In Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979), the court held that in instructing the jury on the ordinary
consumer expectation test, the jury need not be told that the expectations of the ordinary consumer
must be reasonable;jurors know ''what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or use
of a product" and jurors "would [not] or could [not] apply any standard or test outside that of their
own experiences and expectations." Id. at 851. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court stated,
inconsistently and without further explanation, that evidence about ordinary consumer expectations as well as risk and utility can be introduced in design defect litigation. Id. at 847. This latter
statement was meant to refer possibly to cases involving the risk-utility balancing test, which the
court adopted for future design defect cases. See text accompanying notes 79-BO il/ft0'
44. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239
(1978). Although the court in Barhr created a two-pronged test, the second prong of which is the
risk-utility test, the first part of the jury instructions adopted for this test is, in fact, the user-oriented
test.

652

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 30:643

manufacturer or supplier with this knowledge would not have placed it
on the market. 45 Neither instruction gives the jury any criteria by which
to decide whether the manufacturer's design is adequate, nor does it
give the manufacturer any guidance regarding how safe he must make
the product.46
Before designing a product, a manufacturer could try to determine an
ordinary consumer's expectations of its performance and safety by conducting a public opinion survey. No court using either the user-oriented
or the seller-oriented approach, however, has indicated that a product's
design would be deemed adequate if its safety and performance features
complied with consumer expectations as determined by surveys. Even if
survey results were held determinative under the user-oriented standard,
courts do not specify clearly what group of consumers should be used in
determining ordinary consumer expectations. Courts give no indication
whether ordinary consumer expectations are those of ordinary consumers throughout the country, the state, or the neighborhood where the
plaintiff purchased the product.47
If courts accept surveys as evidence of ordinary consumer expectations
in design defect cases under either the user-oriented or the seller-oriented standard, certain problems remain. Public opinion surveys must
poll a representative sample of relevant consumers. Furthermore, if jurors are to determine average consumer expectations based upon either
their own experiences or the testimony of an expert witness, courts must
provide a frame of reference upon which to base such a determination. 48
Even if courts that apply the user-oriented standard provide manufacturers, expert witnesses, and juries with a frame of reference for consumer expectations, manufacturers probably would face high costs in
designing products to meet consumers' expectations in a particular locality. Manufacturers would be forced to determine ordinary consumer
expectations in each jurisdiction, either through surveys or expert witnesses, and would have to design and manufacture products to conform
45. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-93, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). &e
also Welch v. Outboard Motor Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. Injurisdictions that follow the user-oriented test and allow recovery in a design defect case
even if the defect is patent,sit note 18supra, the obviousness of the defect to the ordinary person is a
relevant factor in determining ordinary consumer expectations with respect to the product's safety.
&e Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (rex. Civ. App. 1972) (obvious lack of
decal on glass door to warn of its existence not beyond contemplation of ordinary consumer);
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (obvious lack of kill switch on
motorboat not beyond contemplation of consumer).
47. The plaintifPs residence, the place of injury, or the location of design or manufacture of
the product could also provide the frame of reference for determining ordinary consumer
expectations.
48. &e Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (where no direct or
circumstantial evidence available, testimony of expert witness may be sufficient for jury to find
product failed to meet reasonable consumer expectations).
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to each jurisdiction's design standard. The more substantial the variation among the various standards, the greater the manufacturer's costs.
User-oriented or seller-oriented tests that permit design defect standards
to vary among jurisdictions might place such a substantial burden on
interstate commerce that such standards might be found unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 49
The user-oriented test also poses problems in defining ordinary consumer expectations where the person injured is a user of the product
who was neither the purchaser nor a bystander injured by someone else's
use of the product. This problem exists because the courts following the
ordinary consumer expectation test do not indicate whether the ordinary consumer in question is the person who purchased the product or
selected its user or is the person injured by the product. Questions arise
about whether the safety of a product purchased by an adult for use by
a child should be measured from the standpoint of the child's expectations or the adult's expectations,50 or where a patient is injured by a
drug a physician prescribes, whether the test should be defined in terms
of the doctor's expectations or the patient's expectations. 51 Similar
questions arise in cases involving employees who are injured while using
equipment or products selected or purchased by the employer or other
cmployees52 or when one party involved in an accident is injured by a
product belonging to another. 53 Problems also occur when the person
injured by a product has lower expectations of product safety or performance because of expertise or cynicism. 54
The user-oriented standard also is inadequate to resolve several other
types of cases. For example, the test is inapplicable in situations in
which an ordinary consumer has no definite expectations about the
product because he has no idea how safe it can be made. 55 He thus is
49. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3; $(( Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
In 8100, the Supreme Court held that even a state in the exercise of its police power may offend the
commerce clause if, by a safety regulation, it places too heavy a burnen on interstate commerce,
uncompensated by compelling advantages. Id. at 529.
50. .Y( Bellote v. Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 352 A.2d 723 (1976) (court determines "unreasonably dangerous" from parent's viewpoint where parent buys pajamas for child, and child sets self on
fire while playing with matches).
51. .Y( V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) (standard for
"unreasonably dangerous" determined by expectations of ultimate consumer, the patient, even if
prosthesis selected and implanted by physician).
52. .Y( Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (where plaintiff
injured by paint that ignited, standard for "unreasonably dangerous" determined by expectations
of ultimate user, the painter, not his employer).
53. .Y( Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971) ("unreasonably dangerous" not determined by expectations of driver in one car who was injured by second car).
54. .Y( Rheingold, WluIt aT( 1M ConsuouT'.r "R(osonaok ExjJ(ctoti'ons"?, 29 Bus. LAw. 589, 593
n.l6 (1967).
55. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978) (citing Wade, supra note 1, at 829).
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unable to recover for his injuries because he did not have the requisite
expectation. Another type of case in which the test does not provide
suitable results occurs in situations in which products with a dangerous
or unsafe reputation cause a consumer's injury. In such cases, ordinary
consumers, anticipating the possibility of being injured by such a product, would also be denied recovery. 56
.D.

The Rislc-Utililjl Test

Under the risk-utility test, either the judge or the jury can determine
whether the magnitude of the risk of harm presented by a product's
design outweighs its utility in order to hold the manufacturer liable. 57
Under this test, a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused to a consumer engaged in a reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product,
if the judge or the jury finds that a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would not have marketed such a product after considering its hazards
and utility as well as the ease of adopting an alternative safer design. 58
In applying the risk-utility test, courts weigh a number of factors to
determine whether the product's design subjects a user to an unreasonable risk of injury.59 Many courts that apply this test consider the following factors in balancing a product's overall risks and utility: (1) its
usefulness and desirability to both the user and the general public; (2)
the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury; (3) the availability of
safer alternatives; (4) the ease and expense with which the manufacturer
could modify the design to eliminate its unsafe character without impairing its utility; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by exercising care
in its use; (6) the user's awareness of the inherent dangers, either because
of the product's obvious unsafe condition or the existence of suitable
56. Id. at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
57. See Rmaoed Conlrotmsy, supra note 3, at 775 n.lO. For further discussion of the respective
roles of the judge and jury in a risk-utility analysis, see notes 67-82 & accompanying text l;yra.
58. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 172-74,386 A.2d 816, 821, 825-28
(1978). One court has explained its preference for this test on the grounds that a finding of a design
defect by balancing the diverse factors relating to its desirability and dangerousness represents a
determination that the design is "wrong"; the court, therefore, is justified in imposing legal responsibility for the resulting harm. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979).
59. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (automobile manufacturer under a duty to avoid unreasonable risk); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201,321 A.2d 737 (1974) (negligent automobile design subjected user to unreasonable risk during
"second collision'); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152,386 A.2d 816 (1978) (feasibility
and expense of installing safety lock weighed against risk of harm renders product unreasonably
dangerous); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976)
(photo-offset press machine manufacturer liable if plaintiff exposed to unreasonable risk of harm);
Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) (where only six or seven cases of inadvertent
hood openings reported in seven or eight years, jury could find risk of injury not unreasonable);
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (failure to construct car
roofs with roll bars or roll capes exposed user to unreasonable risk), rev'd on other groundt, 584 S.W.2d
844 (Tex. 1979). See also Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
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warnings or instructions; and (7) the manufacturer's ability to absorb
the loss through price adjustments or liability insurance. 60 In cases involving alleged defects in the crashworthiness of automobiles,61 for example, courts following the risk-utility test weigh the style, type, and
particular purpose of the automobile,62 the price of the automobile,63
the cost of changing the design to eliminate the risk,64 the nature of the
accident that resulted in plaintiff's injury,65 and the extent to which an
alternative design proposed by the plaintiff would pose a safety hazard
greater than that of the existing design.66
Courts that follow the risk-utility test in design defect cases disagree
on the nature of the respective roles of the judge and the jury in a jury
trial.67 Some courts require the trial judge to apply the risk-utility test
only to determine whether to send a design defect case to a jury. In these
jurisdictions, the jury applies a design defect standard that differs from
60. These factors are suggested in Wade, supra note 1, at 837·38. Se~ General Elec. Co. v.
Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 364, 498 P.2d 366, 369 (1972) (injury arising despite reasonable care in product's
use). Se~ also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-74, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978).
Cj'. Fischer, supra note 3, at 359 (listing 15 factors courts should consider in imposing strict liability).
It should be noted that some jurisdictions that have rejected the patent defect rule,s~~ note 18supra,
nevertheless consider the obvious character of the defect as one factor in the overall balancing
process. Se~ Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qffd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); if. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282,252 A.2d 855 (1969) (no liability where
position of power lawnmower blade was obvious and not latent defect); s~~ note 18 supra.
61. Se~ note I supra.
62. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072 (4th Cir. 1974) (citing
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969», in which the court stated
that a "convertible could not be made 'as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard four-door sedan
with center posts and full-door frames.'" Se~ also Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484
P.2d 47 (1971) (intended purpose of 4O-ton earth-mover should be considered in determining if it
was designed negligently).
63. Se~ Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974) (Cadillac
may be expected to afford greater protection than economy car).
64. Se~ Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 218, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974) (in
determining reasonableness of design, cost of design change must be weighed against resulting
amount of added protection).
65. "It could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable because
its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed." Dyson
v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969), fjUO/~d in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974). A related legal principle in products liability
law holds a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by any foreseeable use of a product, with foreseeability a question of fact for the jury except where the accident occurs in a manner so "bizarre"
that reasonable minds could not differ. Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579,
587, 398 A.2d 490, 496 (1979), rev'ri on other grounds suO nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286
Md. 714,410 A.2d 1039 (1980). A plaintifi; however, does not have to establish that the particular
manner in which the harm occurs or the accident happens was reasonably foreseeable. Se~, ~.g.,
Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973) (liability is not dependent on the
ability to foresee the manner in which a lawnmower will be put to its foreseeable use); Newman v.
Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977) (inquiry should focus on foreseeable
uses of product, not foreseeability of harm).
66. Se~ Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, r~hean"ngdmi~d, 282 Or. 411,
579 P.2d 1287 (1978); O'Donnell, lR.rign LI~igalion and Sirict Lia/;i/ity: The /tob/em ofJuty Insl17J&tions
Which lJo Nol Insl17J&l, 56 J. URB. L. 1051, 1060 (1979).
67. See gmera/IJ' O'Donnell, supra note 66.
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the one the judge applies in determining whether to send the case to the
jury. The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, requires the trial judge
to apply the risk-utility test in deciding whether to send a design defect
case to the jury; the trial judge then instructs the jury under the useroriented or the seller-oriented approach of the consumer expectations
test. 68 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court requires the trial judge
to apply the risk-utility test initially to determine if the case should go to
the jury. The court then requires the judge to charge the jury "in terms
of whether the product was reasonably fit . . . for its intended or foreseeable purposes when inserted by the defendant into the strea~ of commerce and, if not, whether as a result damage or injury was incurred by
the contemplated users or others who might reasonably be expected to
come in contact with it."69 When warranted by the particular factual
situation or by the nature of the defect, the court will tailor its instructions to focus the jury's attention on any of the factors generally considered under the risk-utility balancing test for which specific proof exists. 70
In Azzarello y. Blacle Brothers CO.,71 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
implicitly adopted the risk-utility test by indicating that the question of
whether a product's design is defective and unreasonably dangerous
within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement involved a determination that the unavoidable danger it may pose outweighs its utility.7 2 The court stated that this determination is a question oflaw, the
resolution of which depends upon social policy rather than a factual
dispute otherwise reserved for the jury. 73 In adopting an approach similar to that of the Oregon Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania court decided that application of the risk-utility test constituted a judicial
determination of whether the case should go to the jury; the judge
should then instruct the jury that it must determine whether the facts
support the averments in the complaint. 74 The court in Azzarello held
that a jury instruction suggesting that a product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous is a reversible error because it fails to provide a
juror with adequate guidance. 75 The court stated that once the matter is
before the jury, the judge should instruct the jury that it "may find a
defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature
68. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 463-64, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974). See notes 33-56 &
accompanying text supra.
69. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 176, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
70. Id.; Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 174-75,386 A.2d 816, 827 (1978).
71. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
72. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
73. It!. See gmnalfy O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 1070-74.
74. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978).
75. Id.
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that renders it unsafe for the intended use."76
Several courts that require the jury to apply the risk-utility test do not
provide guidance regarding the standard to be applied by the trial judge
in deciding whether to send a design defect case to a jury. The courts
also do not require jury instructions to explain the factors that the jury
should weigh in applying the risk-utility balancing test. In Alaska, for
example, the trial judge is not required to determine that the evidence is
sufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find for the plaintiff on the issue
of proximate cause before submitting the plaintiff's case to the jury.77
The jury is instructed to find the design defective if the plaintiff proves
that the design proximately caused his injury and if the defendant is
unable to prove that the benefits of the challenged design outweighed its
risk of harm. 78
The somewhat different approach by a Texas court similarly fails to
require the jury to be directed to consider any specific criteria in weighing the risk of harm against the product's utility and relies instead upon
the evidence proffered by the parties to direct the jury's attention to
relevant criteria. 79 The Texas approach requires the jury to be instructed simply that it should find a design to be defective if it is "unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of
the product and the risk involved in its use."80 Unlike the Alaska approach, however, the Texas approach does have the trial judge apply
the risk-utility balancing test to the proffered evidence to determine if
the case should initially be allowed to go to the jury; it does not inform
the tri(~.l judge, however, as to which criteria should be applied in performing this review. Furthermore, the trial judge is given no guidance
for determining whether evidence proffered by the parties with respect
to the risk-utility test should be admissible as relevant and material.
The Alaska approach affords less guidance to the manufacturer than
the Oregon, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas approaches regarding
safety features that a manufacturer ought to incorporate into the product.8! While the other four states that use the risk-utility test require the
76. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.
77. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). The Alaska court actually
adopted a two-pronged standard, one prong of which is the risk-utility test that was first proprosed
by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See notes 102-23 & accompanying text ir!fTa. Although the Alaska court did
not adopt only the risk-utility test, the court's comments relative to the risk-utility prong like the
narw standard are applicable to a general discussion of this test.
78. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979).
79. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979).
80. Id. at 847.
81. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the likely consequences of an approach of
this type will be a marked increase in directed verdicts for the plaintiff. Henderson, Products Li'abilil.J: California's Mw Test for lksign lJeflets, 1 CoRPORATION L. REv. 372, 374 (1978).

658

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:643

judge to make an initial risk-utility determination of whether to submit
the case to the jury, Alaska neither requires such a determination nor
provides guidance regarding what factors to consider in the jury's subsequent cost-benefit analysis. Although the other four states provide
greater guidance by having the trial judge determine whether to submit
the case to the jury, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas, like Alaska, do
not require the judge to bring the relevant factors to the jury's attention.
Indeed, the Pennsylvania approach in Azzareflo provides the jury with
an instruction that suggests that the manufacturer must take every precaution, regardless of cost. 82 Under the holding in Azzareflo, manufacturers may well be held liable in all design defect cases submitted to the
jury, subject only to appellate review of a trial judge's initial application
of the risk-utility test.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach, by contrast, provides a
manufacturer with a greater degree of guidance in designing a product.
Under this approach, both the judge and the jury have to agree that the
manufacturer misapplied the risk-utility analysis before finding his application of the test invalid. 83 Although a manufacturer can never be
entirely sure that he has designed the product to incorporate all the
safety features required by law, the judge-jury relationship under this
approach affords the most guidance.
The appellate courts that have adopted the risk-utility test have not
specified whether all relevant factors must be weighed equally. This lack
of specificity regarding the weight of the relevant factors complicates a
manufacturer's application of the risk-utility test during the design process. Indeed, a judge or a jury, or both, may give different weight to the
relevant factors than did the manufacturer. Furthermore, not all of the
factors considered relevant under the risk-utility analysis can be reduced
to objective monetary terms. Certainly, the cost of developing an alternative design and its ll:ltimate effect on the product's price can be defined precisely in economic terms. Other factors, however, such as the
effect of an alternative design upon the product's utility, are more elusive. Economists can define the loss of a human life or a serious injury in
economic terms,84 yet the precise economic value to be placed upon
these casualties certainly will engender substantial disagreement.85
82. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27 (1978). &1
Henderson, Producls Liabililjl: ConlrolMTsial New Decision on Design Deflcls, 2 CORPORATION L. REV.
246, 248 (1979).
83. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-75, 180-82,386 A.2d 816, 826-27, 82931 (1978).
84. &e W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 489-91 (1980).
85. Id. (provides estimated values of a lost life by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the National Center for Health Statistics).
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Judges, juries, or both, are likely to reject a purely economic analysis
that seeks to justify a failure to incorporate certain design changes when
loss of human life or serious personal injury is involved. 86 Consequently,
the subjective nature of weighing some of the relevant factors under this
test makes the manufacturer's task extremely difficult. Despite earnest
efforts to weigh all factors, the manufacturer can never do more than
second guess how a judge or a jury might apply the test. Although the
risk-utility test specifies criteria for the manufacturer to weigh during
the design process that will be reviewed by a judge or a jury, the test
cannot provide absolute guidance to a manufacturer regarding what
safety features are required in the product's design.87

E.

Th~

California Hybna

T~st

The California Supreme Court has adopted a hybrid design defect
test under which a design is held defective if it is found inadequate
under either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test. In
Bar/c~r lJ. LuI! Engin~mng CO.,88 the California court held that in a design
defect case for strict liability in tort, a two-pronged test should be applied to determine a manufacturer's liability. First, under the consumer
expectations test, a manufacturer may be held strictly liable if the product does not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary consumer who
uses the product for its intended purpose or in a reasonably foreseeable
manner. Alternatively, notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to satisfy
the requirements of the first test, the manufacturer can be held liable if
the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his injuries, and the manufacturer fails to demonstrate that the challenged
design's benefits outweigh its inherent risk of harm. 89
The court in Bar/c~ found the first test analogous to the implied warranty of merchantability of the Uniform Commercial Code90 and noted
that it would consider circumstantial evidence in finding a product de86. &~ id. at 490-91.
87. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 1565, which suggests that if a manufacturer establishes at
trial that he made a good faith effort to apply the risk-utility test in making the design decision, the
trial judge will likely refuse to allow the case to go to the jury.
88. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
89. /d. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
[A] product is defective in design (i) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant
factors . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design.
/d.
90. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. .see U.C.C. § 2-314 {"Unless excluded or
modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.'').
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fective under this test, even if the accident precluded identification of
the specific design defect. 91 The court stated that the second test, the
risk-utility analysis with the burden of proof on the manufacturer, was
necessary because consumers frequently know little or nothing about
safety standards. 92 Under this approach, a jury, in evaluating the adequacy of a product's design, would consider such factors as the dangers
inherent in the challenged design, the probability of such danger, the
financial and mechanical feasibility of alternative designs, and any adverse consequences of an alternative design.93 In a decision subsequent
to Barker, the California Supreme Court suggested that the nature of
the plaintiff's use of the product was also a relevant factor to be considered under the risk-utility analysis of the second Barker test. 94
The plaintiff in a design defect case has an inherent disadvantage in
obtaining the relevant information to prove his case, because only the
manufacturer may know most of the relevant factors to be weighed
under the risk-utility analysis. 95 In order to remedy this dilemma, the
court in Barker held that where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
that the product's design proximately caused his injuries, the burden of
proof rests on the defendant to show that the design was not defective
under a risk-utility analysis. 96 Thus, to sustain his burden and avoid
liability, the defendant must show that the benefits of the challenged
design outweigh the risk of harm. Recognizing the fact that design defect cases implicitly involve a determination of the design's reasonableness with respect to its risks and benefits, the court determined that the
term "unreasonably dangerous" would not be required in California in
91. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,236
(1978). This is a questionable proposition with respect to alleged design defects. If destruction of
the product precludes identification of the specific defect that proximately caused plaintiff's injuries, then the plaintiff could not prove conclusively that a defect in the product's design itself proximately caused his injury. Although a plaintiff cannot prove conclusively that the defect was one of
design or manufacture, he still can prove by circumstantial evidence that the product was defective
when it left the defendant's control. Se~, ~.g., Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.]. 454, 332 A.2d 599
(1975) (circumstantial proof of defect sufficient to support inference that defect was proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974)
(age, prior usage of product, durability, and effective operation without maintenance are circumstantial factors to be considered in determining whether inference is permissible that defect existed
at time product left defendant's control).
92.. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978) (citing Wade, supra note 1, at 829).
93. Jd. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
94. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43,575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380,383-91 (1978) (plaintiff's conduct relative to product is examined and his recovery reduced to extent his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury).
95. Jd. at 748, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
96. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238
(1978). The implications of the impact of the court's allocation of the burden of proof are analyzed
in ReMw~d Controversy, supra note 3, at 782-97.
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a strict liability action under section 402A of the Restatement. 97
Although the court indicated that a plaintiff who fails to show that a
product was designed defectively under the ordinary consumer expectations test can still prove design defectiveness under the risk-utility test, it
did not address expressly whether liability could be imposed upon a
manufacturer who has indeed sustained his burden under the risk-utility
test. 98 The court suggested, however, that a manufacturer who met his
burden under the risk-utility test might be held liable under the ordinary consumer expectations test. 99 The uncertainty regarding the imposition of liability on a party who has satisfied his burden has resulted in
at least one court rejecting the Barker approach on the grounds that it
97. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432·34, 573 P.2d 443, 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
238·39 (1978). The "unreasonably dangerous" element was first eliminated by the California
Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972) (manufacturing defect case). The justification for such a change was the court's concern
that a strict liability in tort standard that follows § 402A literally might force a plaintiff to prove
that a product was defective tmd unreasonably dangerous. The court cited this double burden of
proof as unduly burdensome to an injured plaintiff. It interpreted such an increased burden as
inconsistent with the development of strict liability in tort, a doctrine that sought to eliminate the
problems of proof inherent in pursuing claims of negligence and warranty. By eliminating the
"unreasonably dangerous" element, the court in Cronin sought to remove any taint of a negligence
standard in imposing strict liability on a manufacturer. Id. at 133-34,501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 441-43. The court in Boder found this holding in Cronin equally applicable to a design
defect case. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
228 (1978).
Courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey also have rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" element in strict liability actions. oUt', t'.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979) (design defect cases); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975) (design defect and manufacturing defect cases). Other courts, however, have rejected
the approach in Cronin. oUt', t'.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pothoff
v. Alms, 41 Colo. App. 51, 583 P.2d 309 (1978); Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110,240
N.W.2d 154 (1976). These courts, relying upon comments g and i to § 402A of the Restatement,
argue that defective products may not be unreasonably dangerous and should not result in liability.
As stated by the court in Ross v. Up-right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968), the requirement
"that the defect render the product unreasonably dangerous reflects a realization that many products . . . have both utility and danger." oUt' also Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shrivers, 557 S.W.2d 77
(Tex. 1977) (no recovery in strict liability action seeking to recover damages solely for economic loss
because if defect does not cause damage other than that caused to product itself, product is not
unreasonably dangerous).
In a decision following Barker, the California court held that the issue of defective design is to be
determined by consideration of the product as a whole, and not solely from the standpoint of the
product's alleged defectively designed component. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
746-47,575 P.2d 1162, 1174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 392-93 (1978). A court should consider all
safety features of the product in determining whether the manufacturer designed the product defectively. Id. at 747, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
98. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-34, 573 P.2d 443, 452-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
234-39 (1978). The court did not address the issue of whether a manufacturer could be held liable
for a design defect when both parties have satisfied their burdens of proof. If both parties satisfied
their burdens, the jury might then decide in favor of the more persuasive or more effective litigant.
q. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 101 (Tex. 1974) Uohnson,J., dissenting) (in twopronged ordinary consumer expectations test and risk-utility balancing by manufacturer, both parties could satisfy burdens of proof, thus forcing jury to choose which side developed stronger case).
99. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 n.lO, 573 P.2d 443, 455 n.lO, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237 n.1O (1978).
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could confuse a jury.lOO
While the court in Barleer also failed to address directly the issue of
liability for dangerous products lacking safer alternative designs, the
court suggested that liability might be imposed for ultrahazardous productS. lOl The possibility of imposing liability for products that normally
are dangerous suggests that a judge or a jury would be able to impose
liability under the first standard, the ordinary consumer expectations
test, where the product fails to afford consumers, ultimate users, or bystanders a minimum degree of protection. Accordingly, a court could
impose liability on the manufacturer even if he met his burden under
the risk-utility weighing test. In such a case, the manufacturer would be
liable for an ultrahazardous product even though he demonstrated that
no safer alternative design was available or that an alternative design
would make the product too expensive for ordinary c0I.1sumers. I02 Similarly, even if the manufacturer demonstrated that the alternative design
would adversely affect the product's ability to function as intended, liability might still be imposed if it were judged to be inherently
dangerous. I03
The Alaska Supreme Court, which adopted the Barleer test, did not
use precisely the same procedure as California in applying the hybrid
standard. 104 Under the Barleer approach, the trial judge first must determine that it would be reasonable for the jury to find for the plaintiff
before instructing the jury under the two tests. I05 The Alaska court, by
contrast, does not require the trial judge, before sending the case to the
jury, to apply the risk-utility test to determine if the jury could reason100. Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123,576 P.2d 725 (1978). The Supreme Court
of Montana rejected a confusing jury instruction that defined the "unreasonably dangerous" reo
quirement in the different contexts of the ordinary consumer expectations test and the risk-utility
balancing by the manufacturer. The court in Simberg did not object to the "unreasonably" dangerous standard as did the court in Barker. Rather, the confusion that the court in StOlberg cited
emanated from the inherent difficulty in choosing the proper viewpoint, that of the ordinary consumer or the prudent manufacturer. Whether the product is designated as unreasonably dangerous
would depend upon the viewpoint adopted. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844
(rex. 1979), in which the court affirmed a jury instruction that framed "unreasonably dangerous"
solely in the context of the ordinary consumer expectations test and omitted the prudent manufacturer risk-utility test. In so doing, the court in TU17/U rejected the bifurcated approach exemplified
by Barker. Id. at 851.
101. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237
(1978) (citing Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684, 93 Cal. Rptr.
769, 772 (1971».
102. Set' notes 62-64 & accompanying text supra. Risk-utility tests in crashworthiness design
defect cases weigh style and type of automobile, its particular purpose, the price of the automobile,
and the cost of changing the design to eliminate the risk. Id.
103. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,236
(1978). Other courts have also recognized that a product must meet minimum safety standards.
See, e.g., cases cited in note 142 ;'!fra.
104. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
105. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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ably find for the plaintiff. 106 The failure of a judge to screen the test
initially, however, allows the jury to decide cases by whim or caprice.
Moreover, in adopting the Barker approach, the Alaska Supreme Court
fails to give the jury any guidance regarding the application of the ordinary consumer expectations test, and thus it does not promote the development of safety guidelines for manufacturers. 107
F.

Professor Henderson's Test

The sixth identified products liability design defect standard is based
upon Professor James Henderson's thesis that courts should not find a
product's design to be defective if the design is the result of a manufacturer's conscious choice and if certain criteria are met.108 Manufacturer
compliance with applicable safety standards promulgated by the legislature or an administrative agency would preclude liability under Henderson's test. In the absence of applicable governmental standards, any
product that is accompanied by an adequate warning of the risks
presented by its design or that has an obvious inherent risk would not be
adjudged defective.109
The Michigan Court of Appeals, relying upon Henderson's thesis, has
adopted a similar standard. 1 10 In order to establish a prima facie case, a
106. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). The court stated that it did
not "think it necessary to have a two-tier system where the trial judge, before giving the case to the
jury, must first find that it would be reasonable for the jury to find for the plaintiff." ld. at 884.
107. The New Jersey approach, by contrast, which allows the judge to screen the test initially,
furthers the goal of furnishing manufacturers precise guidelines concerning required safety features.
&1 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-74,386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978). Moreover,
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Borin's ordinary consumer expectations test on the
grounds that ordinary consumers have no expertise that would enable them to determine how
safely a product could be designed. The Borin approach to the ordinary consumer expectations
test was also rejected because the court found the implied warranty of merchantability test irrelevant in a strict liability action alleging a design defect.
lOB. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1552-73; f)eflet Litigation, supra note 3, at 793-94. Henderson
distinguishes designs resulting from conscious design choices from inadvertent design errors. Henderson,supra note 1, at 1547. Henderson cites the selection of raw materials of insufficient strength,
fa. at 1548-49, and hidden dangers, id. at 1550, as examples of inadvertent design defects.
109. la. at 1559-60. If governmental regulations specify the warnings and instructions that
must accompany the product, strict compliance with such regulations in the drafting of accompanying warnings and instructions would probably absolve the manufacturer from liability under
Henderson's test. &,, I.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976).
110. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74,268 N.W.2d 291 (1978). In Owens,
plaintiff's spouse was killed when a forklift truck he was operating overturned. Plaintiff, in a strict
liability action against the truck's manufacturer, alleged that the truck was defectively designed
because it lacked seat belts and a protective enclosure for the driver. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of a directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that
no industry or governmental regulation required installation of such devices. &1 also Temple v.
Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (manufacturer who fails to give
suitable warning of product's dangerous propensity guilty of negligence). The court in Tnnpll,
adopting Restatement § 402A, cited commentj, which states that "[i]n order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warnings
. . . as to its use."
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plaintiff alleging a defective design must show that the particular design
did not conform with a predetermined standard set, for example, by the
industry or by government regulation. Alternatively, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that the inherent risks of the design are latent and that the manufacturer has failed to provide an
adequate warning to potential users about such risks. III
Henderson does not disagree with the almost universally accepted
principle that a manufacturer is not immune from liability in a common
law suit for injuries proximately caused by a product's defective design,112 regardless of whether it complies with current legislative or administrative safety standards. 113 Henderson, however, argues that
courts should defer to governmental standards because judges and juries
have neither the expertise nor the competence to evaluate and adequately comprehend the complex tradeoffs made by design engineers
during a conscious design process. 1l4 Moreover, he believes adjudication is a totally inappropriate process for determining the adequacy of a
product's design because it allows judges and juries to impose liability
upon manufacturers on an arbitrary basis.115
Under Henderson's theory, courts would not be required to establish
independent design standards in cases of inadvertent design errors.
Rather, liability would depend upon whether the plaintiff established
that "conformance by the defendant manufacturer to customary engineering practices would have prevented the product failure . . . . "116
One problem that a court or a jury faces in applying this test is the
determination of whether a danger presented by a product's design results from an inadvertent design error or a conscious design choice. The
various articles in which Henderson has presented his approach provide
111. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74,81,268 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1978).
112. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) (National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976), cited as federal
standard not precluding common law liability: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.').
113. Federal automobile design safety standards, first established by Congress in 1966, were
intended to supplement rather than obviate the law of negligence and products liability. See, e.g.,
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), Teu'ri on other grounds,
584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
114. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1577.
115. Id. at 1558. Henderson cites irresistible social pressure that generally favors injured plaintiffs as an underlying factor in the unsuitability of adjudication for determining design standards.
Henderson notes that "[c]ourts would inevitably resort to some form of judicial coin-flipping, i.e.,
they would begin to determine defendants' liability on some arbitrary basis rather than on the
purported basis of the reasonableness of the product designs brought before them." Id.
116. Id. at 1552. Henderson states that the courts' ability to delegate successfully these standards to the engineering profession is the result of the self-defeating nature of inadvertant errors.
The intended design serves as a standard to condemn the actual design.
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no test to guide judges or juries in making this determination. 117 Further, if the inadvertent design error standard is applied, Henderson
would measure the adequacy of the product's design by determining the
collective or customary standards of the engineering profession. Henderson, however, does not state what test should be applied if members of
the engineering profession disagree about customary practices. Henderson also does not suggest what a court should do if a defendant establishes that his inadvertent design error conforms with universally
accepted engineering standards and the standards are found to be inadequate or unsafe. Henderson cites, and appears to accept, the rule followed by most courts that compliance with industry norms is not the
standard to determine the adequacy of a product's design. 1 is He fails to
explain, however, why courts should defer to customary engineering
practices but not to industry standards. Industry standards often will be
based upon, and thus be indistinguishable from, customary engineering
practices. Absolute deference to customary engineering practices-:-assuming that such practices can be defined-would seem just as objectionable as absolute deference to industry standards.
Henderson's test for evaluating designs that are the result of conscious
design choices would exempt manufacturers from liability for a defective design if two conditions are met. In the absence of government
safety standards, a manufacturer would not be held liable if he enclosed
adequate warnings and instructions with the product and if the design's
risks were reasonably obvious. Henderson would exempt manufacturers
from liability in these two situations, regardless of whether an inexpensive alternative that would not adversely affect the design could eliminate or minimize the risks.
Reliance on warnings rather than on minimum safety design standards, however, might not protect all parties who may have some form
of contact with the dangerous product. For instance, a written warning
would not adequately protect persons who do not encounter the warnings or do not comprehend the product's dangers. These persons include children, unsophisticated or illiterate users of a product, and
bystanders. 119 As a matter of public policy, courts should require manu117. Twerski, Weinstein, Danaher & Piehler, supra note 3, at 528-32.
118. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1557. One rationale for this rule is that the lack of adequate
safety in a product design may be common throughout an entire industry. Id. Evidence of industry
custom has been admitted and has had an impact upon decisions affecting product safety. Id.
Courts following this rule may not defer absolutely to product design standards established by the
industry or by authoritative voluntary associations. &e, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83
Mich. App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978); see also notes 110-11 & accompanying text supra.
119. &e gmnall)' Field, The YOlIIIg C01lSURU1": A Paradigm A1/4l)'sis of the Roles of Public and PrilJ(Jle
Low in Prtvmling and Redressing Ityuries, 29 MERCER L. REv. 523 (1978); Phillips, ProdtJCls Liability for
Pmonalltyiny 10 Minors, 56 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1970).
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facturers to incorporate feasible and inexpensive features in their products to protect such persons from injury.120 This requirement should be
imposed even though warnings or instructions concerning the product's
risks adequately protect most consumers. Similarly unprotected are
those persons who understand explicit warnings or who appreciate the
risks involved but are powerless to respond effectively to such warnings
or risks. Despite the lack of protection afforded these two classes of persons in the absence of minimum safety design standards, Henderson
does not alter his test for these situations. 121
Henderson asserts that his conscious design choice test will eliminate
the need for judicial review of the complex tradeoffs involved in the
design process. Judges that follow the test, however, will be required to
undertake a similar task if relevant government safety standards, with
which the product's design complies, are challenged as being arbitrary
and capricious. 122 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an administrative agency's regulations can be held invalid if found by a court to
be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 123 The administrative action will be held arbitrary and capricious if the agency in promulgating its regulations did not consider all factors relevant to the exercise
of its statutory authority or if it made a clear error in judgment. 124
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, in establishing safety standards to govern a particular product's design, is required
to undertake a risk-utility analysis 125 similar to the risk-utility design
120. Su text accompanying notes 141-43 ir!fia.
121. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1560 n.122.
122. See Henderson, Mamifacturer's LialJi/,{yfor .Deflaive Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Rifonn,
56 N.C.L. REV. 625, 639-40 (1978).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
124. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (court must decide
whether Secretary exceeded powers delegated by Congress).
125. The Consumer Product Safety Commission is authorized to establish requirements regarding the design of products, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(I)(A) (1976), when "reasonably necessary to
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product." Id. § 2056(a)(I).
The Commission is required to consider, prior to promUlgating a design standard:
A) the degree and nature of the risk of injury the rule is designed to eliminate or reduce;
B) the approximate number of consumer products, or types or classes thereof, subject to
such rule;
C) the need of the public for the consumer products subject to such rule, and the probable effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, or availability of such products to meet
such need; and
D) any means of achieving the objective of the order while minimizing adverse effects on
competition or disruption or dislocation of manufacturing and other commercial
practices consistent with the public health and safety.
15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(I) (1976). The Commission shall not promulgate a consumer product safety
rule unless it finds:
A) that the rule (including its effective date) is reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product;
B) that the promulgation of the rule is in the public interest; and
C) in the case of a rule declaring the product a banned hazardous product, that no
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defect test.126 A court reviewing the Commission's risk-utility analysis
must defer to its decision if the agency considered all relevant factors.
The court cannot substitute its weighing of these factors for the
agency's.127 Despite this limitation, a judge reviewing a Commission
standard in a conscious-design-choice case would be involved in a process similar to a determination of whether to send a design defect case to
the jury. 128 Determining whether an agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in applying a risk-utility analysis does not differ significantly
from applying the risk-utility test to determine if reasonable jurors could
disagree about the adequacy of a product's design.
Henderson does not suggest a test that a court should apply in a conscious-design-choice case where the product's design conforms to a government safety standard held invalid on procedural or substantive
grounds under the Administrative Procedure Act. 129 Presumably, the
court would apply the test that is followed in circumstances in which
there is no applicable government standard, thereby not subjecting a
manufacturer to liability if the product contained adequate warnings
and instructions. If this presumption is correct, by accompanying the
product with appropriate warnings and instructions, a manufacturer
whose product's design conforms to applicable government standards
can guard against the possibility of liability for injuries if the standard is
declared invalid.
Henderson's design defect test gives the manufacturer more guidance
regarding the product's requisite features than do the other tests. Yet it
leaves some uncertainties for the manufacturer, such as the determination of whether a design complies with applicable government standards
and whether, in the absence of government standards, the product's
warnings and instructions adequately apprise consumers of the risks
presented by the design and the procedures necessary to avoid such
risks.

III.

A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE DESIGN DEFECT STANDARD

Although at least six tests have been posited for determining whether
a design is defective, with variations in application regarding the judgejury relationship making the number of tests even greater, each test is in
feasible consumer product safety standard under this chapter would adequately protect the public from the unreasonable risk of injury associated with such products.
Ii. § 2058(c)(2). S.... ouo National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, ii. § 1392(f)(3).
126. St~ notes 57-87 & accompanying text supra. St~ ouo Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282
Or. 61, 82-83, 577 P.2d 1322, 1332-36 (1978) (Linde,]., concurring) (comparing FAA aircraft safety
standards with Oregon's product liability standards for design defects).
127. S~~ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 4{)1 U.S. 4{)2, 416 (1971).
128. St~ text accompanying notes 67-82 supra.
129. St~ 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
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some way inadequate. The present standards do not require the judge
or the jury, as a prerequisite to imposing liability upon a manufacturer,
to find that an alternative design exists that is technologically feasible
and that would have prevented plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, by not
considering such an alternative design, the courts also fail to examine
whether a different design would produce a more efficient allocation of
the manufacturer's and society's resources, as determined by a marginal
cost~benefit analysis.
The test proposed in this article provides a variation of the risk-utility
test by initially focusing upon alternative designs that would reduce or
eliminate the risk of danger presented by the existing design. The proposed test would weigh the marginal benefits and utilities afforded by
each alternative design against its marginal costs and risks. 130 The cost
and feasibility of a safer design is one factor that currently is weighed
under the risk-utility test,131 but it is weighed along with other factors in
a subjective balancing approach that does not give the manufacturer
exact guidance regarding safety features required in his product. 132
Under the proposed test, the plaintiff first would have to establish that
there was a technically feasible, alternative design available at the time
the product was designed. The plaintiff must show that this alternative
would have prevented or at least minimized the injuries caused by the
product's design, and that the marginal benefits and utilities resulting
from adoption of the alternative safety feature outweigh its marginal
costs and risks. 133 The test would take into account the extent to which
the risk of harm presented by the existing design is patent or obvious or
is brought to the attention of consumers and bystanders by warnings or
instructions. Under the proposed test, however, "when an unreasonable
danger could have been eliminated without excessive cost or loss of
product efficiency, liability may attach even though the danger was obvious or there was adequate warning."134
130. See Henderson, supra note 122, at 630-32. Henderson proposes a product design liability
statute imposing specific requirements upon plaintiffs that constitute conditions for recovery. Limited defenses are available to defendants if they can meet a set of specifically described circumstances. These conditions imposed upon the parties compel an examination of the benefits and
costs of alternative designs.
13l. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra (discussing subjective nature of this weighing and
the resulting difficulties).
133. ,See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 24, 484 P.2d 47, 62 (1971).
134. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 809, 395 A.2d 843, 847 (1978). See
Rmnved Controversy, supra note 3, at 775-76. An alternative approach would impose upon the plaintiff the burden of establishing that an alternative design or additional safety feature was available
at the time the product was designed that would have prevented or reduced the plaintiff's injuries.
The burden would then shift to the defendant manufacturer to establish that the marginal costs
and risks of such an alternative outweighed its marginal benefits and utilities. The justifieation for
this allocation of the burden of proof, which is similar to the approach taken by the California
Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
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Although such a marginal cost-benefit analysis would involve a subjective weighing of many factors, it would be preferable to the risk-utility test in terms of providing guidance to manufacturers regarding
required safety features. The manfacturers would be directed to search
out and consider all alternative product designs in order to increase the
product's safety without significantly raising its cost to the consumer or
substantially diminishing its utility. Henderson has criticized a similar
proposal on the grounds that a plaintiff's case would rest on theoretical
testimony about alternative designs that have not been tested through
actual experience. 135 Other commentators, however, have argued that a
design defect case based upon such theoretical testimony is no different
than other tort cases in which causation issues are determined by expert
testimony in response to hypothetical questions. 136
Some courts, whether applying the consumer expectations test 137 or
the risk-utility test,138 have held that a plaintiff, in order to establish a
cause of action in a design defect case, must show that there was a safer,
yet practical, alternative design. 139 Moreover, plaintiffs have been asked
to show feasibility in terms of economy, practicality, and technology.140
The proposed test would also require this showing.
Courts, however, have recognized a caveat to this required proof. If
the danger is sufficiently severe and the product has only limited utility,
a judge or a jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not
have introduced such a product into the stream of commerce. HI Many
courts recognize that some products simply are too dangerous to be considered adequately designed. 142 The proposed standard reflects this
(1978), is that "most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the determination of the
adequacy of a product's design under the 'risk-benefit' standard . . . involve technical matters
peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer . . . ." Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 237.
135. See Henderson, mpra note I, at 1569-71. See also O'Oonnell,Dl!.fign Litigation and the State of
the Art: Terminology, Prtuti'ce and Rifonn, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627, 646-61 (1978); Comment, The State if
the Art Defnue in ProdlKis LiMrlily: "Unreasonob()' lJangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DUQ. L. REV.
915 (1980).
136. Twerski, Weinstein, Oonaher & Piehler, mIra note 3, at 532-34.
137. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1978).
138. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law); Loli v.
Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying Illinois law).
139. See notes 137-38 mpra.
140. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 70,577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978) (plaintiff must show effect of alternative design on "cost, economy of operation, maintenance requirements, overall performance, [and] safety''). See also Loli v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th
Cir. 1974).
141. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 7I n.5, 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (1978).
142. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chern. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (strict liability imposed for facial bums from liquid drain cleaner with unnecessarily high concentration of an
unreasonably caustic chemical); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (most
stringent warning would not have prevented gun from firing when buyer grabbed it as it slipped
during unloading); Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 III. App. 3d 525, 380 N.E.2d 445
(1978) (despite adequate warnings, adhesive too volatile and flammable for intended use); Sturm,
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same caveat in the plaintiff's burden of proof. Even if a plaintiff could
not convince the judge or the jury that an alternative design would have
been better than the existing design, a judge or a jury should be permitted to hold that the product presents such a substantial danger to the
public that it should not be distributed and sold, even though it incorporates all feasible safety features and includes adequate warnings and
instructions.
As a matter of public policy, courts should hold a manufacturer liable
for injuries caused by a product he designed and marketed where the
product, although accompanied by adequate warnings and instructions,
presents a significant risk of danger to consumers and bystanders when
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. This policy should prevail regardless of the cost of adopting safer alternative designs. Such judicial
policy would be consistent with the administrative regulatory authority
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to ban the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of products that present an unacceptable risk to
public health and safety.143 The proposed test, however, would recognize, as have the courts that follow comment k of Restatement section
402A,I44 that a manufacturer should not be liable for injuries caused by
the design of an "unavoidably unsafe" product where the product's utility outweighs its risk of harm, and the product contains adequate warnings and instructions.
Applying the risk-utility test, some courts have held that the magnitude of the risk of harm should be determined either at the time of
trial 145 or at the time of sale. 146 Under the proposed test, the judge or
the jury should determine whether a better design was feasible at the
time the manufacturer designed the product. 147 Moreover, if a feasible,
Ruger & Co. v. Boyd, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) '8209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (no warning sufficient
where light blow to hammer caused gun to fire); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass.
1978) (no warning sufficient where slight change in design of blade on garbage truck would have
prevented serious if not fatal injury). Se~ also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 3,
at 526.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1976).
144. Se~, ~.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) (professional hair
bleaching product not defective where appropriate instructions given), &"1. d~1Il~d, 391 U.S. 913
(1968); Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966) (drug prescribed to patient for arthritis
not defective); McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965) (druggists not liable where
prescription filled in accordance with directions); W. KIMBLE & R.O. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 56, 84-85 (West's Series 1979). Prescription drugs are an example of worthwhile "unavoidably unsafe" products.
145. Se~, e.g., Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968) (evaluates present risk of
harm of six-year-old ladder).
146. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.]. 152, 181,386 A.2d 816, 830 (1978)
(balances gravity of risk to workman operating machine with feasibility and expense of installing
safety device in 1956 when machine sold).
147. Se~ Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Mondshour v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. III (D. Md. 1979). See gmera/()I O'Donnell, supra note 135; Phillips,
supra note 3, at 115-19; Comment, supra note 135, at 915.
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safer alternative design becomes available between the time of design
and the time of manufacture or sale, the manufacturer should have a
duty to adopt such a design. This duty would arise unless the cost of
retooling machinery, casting new dies and molds, and revising already
manufactured components and products is greater than the existing design's risk of harm to consumers and bystanders. If such a feasible alternative design becomes available after the product has been
manufactured, distributed, or sold to consumers, the manufacturer
should not have a duty to recall the product in order to replace or modify it if the costs of a recall outweigh the existing design's risk to consumers and bystanders. 148

IV.

CONCLUSION

The standards that courts presently apply to determine whether a
product's design is defective do not provide the manufacturer with sufficient guidance regarding safety requirements that must be incorporated
into a product. In actual practice, design defect cases involve a marginal risk-utility analysis comparing a product's design with alternatives
that might have reduced or prevented plaintiff's injuries. 149 Adoption of
a design defect standard that focuses upon alternatives to the product's
design, coupled with a requirement that products meet minimum safety
standards, would reflect the actual way in which most courts decide design defect cases. Concomitantly, consumers would be protected from
dangerously designed products, and manufacturers would have more
specific guidance regarding the safety features to be included in their
products that are required by law.

148. The costs of recall, modification, and replacement that a manufacturer would have to
bear in complying with this duty would include the transaction costs of locating products that have
left his control and possession. Such costs may be high, and the feasibility oflocating products low,
if retailers have sold the products to members of the public. This would be true particularly in the
case oflow-priced products for which the retailer does not keep records of individual transactions or
for which the manufacturer does not use owner or warranty registration cards. Even if products
that have been sold to consumers can be located, the manufacturer will incur administrative expenses in contacting the product's present owners and arranging for its return to him or a service
outlet for modification or replacement.
149. Suo ~.g., Henderson, supra note I, at 1567-68; Renewed ControlJl!TSY, supra note 3, at 774-76.

